The Private Language Argument
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Wittgenstein and the referential theory of meaning - meaning is use, following a rule
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Wittgenstein is not exactly a behaviourist. It is not so much that Wittgenstein adheres to a behaviourist view of the mind, since behaviourism is, after all, a specific scientific theory, but that he regards all language, in so far as it is incommunicable, as occurring within the context of behaviour. Terms for Wittgenstein do not refer at all, so it wouldnot be correct to say that for him sensation words like 'pain' refer to pain behaviour. His point is slightly more subtle than that. For him reference is not the key to meaning at all. It is only in the context of behaviour that terms can have meaning, and it is how they are used in relation to a pattern of behaviour that constitutes their meaning. Only behaviour is publicly observable, and hence only meaning that relates to behaviour can serve as the basis of communication. So the 'meaning' of a term like 'pain' is not a private sensation, nor an abstract entity (a form, or universal); actually, the noun 'meaning' is confusing. Being a substantive noun it makes us look for an object to which it refers – looking for the meaning of 'meaning'. But there is no object (according to Wittgenstein), just how we use the word. A person can be said to understand the word 'pain' when he responds to utterances containing it in ways that are normal to competent language users. This is why Wittgenstein advances the doctrine that meaning is use. A sentence containing the word 'pain' is a stimulus that can provoke a response from someone else. For instance, a child might say to its mother, 'I have a pain in my tummy!' The mother will respond in ways that are normal and correct for a person in that situation, and who understands the language. Hence, for Wittgenstein, all 'understanding' as such involves following a rule. '11. Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, nails and screws. – the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.) Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we her them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially, when we are doing philosophy! 23.But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? – There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.) Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. 43. For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.' Thus, in a sense, people don't really understand anything when they use and respond to words. Hence, we have to start putting words like meaning and understanding into inverted commas, when we are discussing Wittenstein's interpretation of them; because there is no 'meaning' as such, and 'understanding' requires no conscious, mental state, no cognition, simply a process of following a rule. So we could say that according to Wittgenstein there is no 'meaning' and there is no 'understanding' when we use words in our language.
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Contents of
The Private Language Argument
1 Modern philosophy, introspection and behaviourism
2 Wittgenstein and the private language argument
3 Wittgenstein and the referential theory of meaning - meaning is use, following a rule
4 Wittgenstein and the disappearance theory of meaning
5 Wittgenstein and his answer to the transcendental deduction of Plato
6 The private language argument and the conceptual analysis of the term I - language games
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