The Private Language Argument
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Wittgenstein and the private language argument
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The rejection of the Cartesian interpretation of mind, with the primacy of introspection, has been further supported by the private language argument advanced by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein also rejects the referential theory of meaning – the theory that the terms of our language have meaning because of what they refer to. The reference, (a) predicates (e.g. '… is red'), and (b) sensations (e.g. 'pain') would seem to point in the direction of private mental states. But for Wittgenstein this is a bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. '255. The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.' He argues that neither predicates nor terms for sensations could gain their meaning through reference to private mental states. This is because a language based on references to private mental states would use terms that could not be communicated; it would render communication impossible. '256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations? – As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation? In that case my language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might understand it as well as I. – But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sensation, but only had the sensation? And now I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in descriptions. - 257 'What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'.' – Well, let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation! – But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he used the word. – So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone? – But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'? - How has he done this naming of pain? And whatever he did, what was its purpose? – When one says 'He gave a name to his sensation' one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word 'pain'; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. 293. If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the world 'pain' means – must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! –Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.- No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.' Wittgenstein considers the relationship between his theory of meaning and behaviourism. '307. 'Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?' – If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.' For Wittgenstein, the meaning of a term is conveyed in the use of rules; you know what a word means when you know how to respond correctly to a sentence using it.
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Contents of
The Private Language Argument
1 Modern philosophy, introspection and behaviourism
2 Wittgenstein and the private language argument
3 Wittgenstein and the referential theory of meaning - meaning is use, following a rule
4 Wittgenstein and the disappearance theory of meaning
5 Wittgenstein and his answer to the transcendental deduction of Plato
6 The private language argument and the conceptual analysis of the term I - language games
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