Neutral Monism
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Phenomenalism
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Nonetheless, the idea that there are sense-data has led some philosophers to further conclusions about physical objects. This is the case in the philosophy of phenomenalism advanced by A.J. Ayer. Ayer adopted this philosophy from Bertrand Russell who discovered it half way through writing The Problems of Philosophy. Both Russell and Ayer maintain that perceptions are comprised of sense-data and that sense-data exist before the mind, rather than in the mind. We have already examined this idea of a distinction between being before and in the mind, and it is questionable whether this distinction is real. However, they suppose that it is, and they suppose that the distinction makes sense-data in some sense independent of consciousness. The sense-data can therefore act as the primary raw material out of which to construct all other objects. Phenomenalists argue that all physical objects are nothing but sense-data and constructions out of sense-data. The sense-data are the primary, raw building blocks of objects of all kinds. Macro physical objects and composites of sense-data. They claim that this solves the problem of external reality; since (a) we are directly acquainted with sense data, so we know that they exist: (b) since sense data are before the mind, they exist independently of the mind. Hence we know of the existence of a reality existing independently of the mind. We would argue that this doctrine is an attempt to have your cake and eat it! The reality that could exist if it were made of sense-data is still very far short of the reality that is called into question by the problem of perception. To see this, consider the question, has this philosophy solved the problem of other minds? And whose sense-data do we see when we see any sense-data? In short, the sense data are still private to the subjective consciousness that has them. Therefore we cannot construct a public realty, common to all perceivers out of sense-data. It may be that the sense-datum I see when I look at a red bulls-eye is the same as the sense datum you see when also looking at it, but I have to believe this to be the case, since I do not look at it with your eyes. In other words, if the reality made of sense-data is public then I am not acquainted with it; if I am acquainted with sense-data, then they cannot be used to construct a public reality. Furthermore, the existence of sense-data can also be called into question.
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Contents of
Neutral Monism
1 Sense data, atoms of perception
2 Hume, sense-data, sense impressions and atoms of experience
3 Entrapment within subjectivity, ideas
4 Neutral monism, realism, Russell, A.J. Ayer, Qualia
5 Is the whole a composite of its parts?
6 Space, time, continuity and atomism
7 Phenomenalism
8 The philosophy of logical atomism
9 Logical atomism, complex sentences and intensional contexts
10 Human identity in the context of naive realism
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