The Paradox of Induction
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Swinburn and confirmation theory
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Another possibility might be that induction is its own justification. The philosopher Swinburn adopts this approach arguing that inductive reasoning is sui generis, its own kind of reasoning, and that in some cases inductive reasoning can reach a state of "confirmation". If the particular instances of a general law have been observed for a sufficient number of times, then the general law will be confirmed. Yet this is not a solution either, for it also acknowledges that the paradox of induction cannot be solved, but claims that a weaker state of "knowledge", which fall short of infallibility, is acceptable. Such a state is that of having a "confirmed" belief. The problem with this is that the chicken's expectation that it would always be fed would surely be confirmed by this rule, so the appeal to confirmation does not sort out "good" inductions from "bad".
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Contents of
The Paradox of Induction
1 Prescriptive philosophy of science
2 The problem or paradox of induction
3 Hume and the formulation of the paradox of induction
4 Attempts to solve the paradox of induction
5 The paradox of induction and the claim that probability is all we ought to seek
6 Swinburn and confirmation theory
7 Falsificationism and the paradox of induction
8 Extrapolation and interpolation
9 Occam razor and the paradox of induction
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